Analysis of Generosity is Contagious, Study Shows-But Selfishness is Too Article

Analysis of Generosity is Contagious, Study Shows-But Selfishness is Too Article

The article Generosity is Contagious, Study Shows-But Selfishness is Too by Andrew Moseman (2010) discusses that James Fowler and Nicholas Christakis ran an experiment to see how individuals react in a game simulation.  The researchers were interested to see how individuals reacted when given a choice between community contributions.  In the game simulation, participants were given credits and could contribute to a communal pot or not; there were several rounds included in the study.  If all participated then everyone would end with more credits; however participants were unaware of the amount contributed by others in the group.  The study found that both generosity and selfishness in the game scenario had a ripple effect throughout the study; participants tended to continue the behavior they experienced in a previous round of the game.

Some of the values tested in this experiment were the sense of shared community versus individual wellbeing or preservation.  This is also combined with the presence of imperfect information.  It was interesting to see that the effect of an individual’s action could not have an impact during the current round of play, but rather in subsequent rounds with new group members.  I feel that this simulation reflects Lessig’s (2006) constructs of norms and the market.  Specifically, I would state that the game tests norms which affect market behavior.  Lessig (2006) said of norms, “… (norms are) a set of understandings constrain behavior” (124).  In the simulation, participants reacted to what they observed from others during a simulation in subsequent interactions.  If generosity was the value demonstrated in a given round, the study found that that train tended to be used in other rounds, the same for selfish interactions.  This was done in the sphere of a market setting where resources existed as credits and individuals could choose to operate on their own or to invest in the community pot.  Lessig (2006) discusses how markets can be constrained- in this example he refers to law, but social norms can similarly alter market choices, especially in a limited market simulation as described, “The law uses taxes to increase the market’s constraint on others.  We tax cigarettes in part to reduce their consumption, but we subsidize tobacco production to increase its supply.” (127). The driving motivator in the simulation is personal wellbeing and reaction to the “community” of the game simulation group.

There are always changes of behavior when conducting social experiments since participants are aware their behavior is under scrutiny.  This knowledge in itself modifies behavior.  People are more likely to do what they think the researcher is looking for, even if they do not know what that is.  However, there were strengths in their research structure.  Participants could only increase their credits when everyone participated yet this information was not given to them, nor was the actions of their group members.  This reflects the world well; individuals can only be responsible for themselves at the end of the day.  Rather that come up with a completely different scenario, I would like to add an additional component.  I would be interested to see if the game simulation outcome would be altered if the location was put on the internet so that participants would not have to leave their homes or places of work.  A face to face interaction may have a differing impact on a participant than an individual on the web.  This is important because for the most part individuals do not have to leave their comfortable environment in real world interactions.  However, the sense of community in a web based environment may not change the way people can be influenced the choice of others.  An additional component to the simulation could be a small tax at the beginning of each iteration- let’s say 2 credits.  This would include the law component of Lessig’s construct.  It also may impact how generous individuals are willing to be.  Lessig (2006) discussed how the presence of a law can impact the norms of participating individuals; a great example was how liberals and conservatives perceive and react to sex education in public schools (129).  If a mandatory contribution was included, there may be more polarization than in the simulation where any contribution was completely optional.

The great part about this particular article was that it discussed an experiment rather than an actual action taken, as with some of the other experiments.  This changes the intent of alterations- the study looks to observe phenomena as opposed to observing the actual outcome of a public program or policy.  This study can be used as background for other researchers when designing their own experiments of individual choices in a community setting.  Lessig’s discussion of the constraints on individuals would be helpful for the validity of this study.  He argues that four constraints simultaneously have an impact on an individual’s outcome; architecture, market, law and norms (123).  For the study to match the real world, elements the four constraints need to be included.  I feel that my addition of the mandatory contribution, Lessig’s law component, would increase the external validity of the study since especially in America taxes are a very real part of a citizen’s interaction with the government, which can have drastic changes on how generous they choose to be with other individuals or community causes.